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Abstract
The main advantage of decentralization over centralized government 
is its informational superiority. Local service delivery can then be tailored to 
the needs and preferences of the citizens. This paper analyses if this assertion, 
that holds for developed countries, is also valid in the case of a post-conﬂict 
low-income country. Since there is no panacea for successful decentraliza-
tion, it then confronts theory with the case of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC). Finally the author assesses the new law on decentralization in 
this country.
Résumé
L’avantage principal d’une décentralization politique est la supériorité 
d’information concernant les préférences des citoyens. La production de biens 
publics locaux peut alors être mieux adaptée aux besoins des gouvernés. Ce 
document de travail analyse si cette hypothèse qui vaut pour un pays dével-
oppé , est aussi valable dans un pays à faible revenu et sortant d’un conﬂit. 
Puisqu’il n’y a pas une formule unique pour  une décentralization réussie , le 
document confront la théorie avec le cas de ﬁgure de la République Démocra-
tique du Congo (DRC). Enﬁn l’auteur évalue la nouvelle loi sur la décentrali-
zation dans ce pays.IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05 • 5
1.  Introduction
    Development thinking has always been dominated by certain in-
sights and fashions that prop up and then disappear after new insights more or 
less eclipse the former. The ﬁfties were dominated by the concepts of take-off 
and accumulation of physical capital. The sixties by planning and the need for 
an active state to be followed by a basic needs approach and a new interna-
tional order in the seventies. The eighties and nineties stressed  structural ad-
justment and the necessity of getting the fundamentals right. The Millenium 
Development Goals and the new international ﬁnancial architecture ﬁnally 
put the poverty, good governance and market democracy issues in the middle 
of the new concerns (Hirschman 1984, Sen. 1984 and 2001, Stiglitz 1999).
It is in this latter vein and developments that decentralization issues 
begot a favorable prejudice. Indeed, it was thought that good governance and 
the process of democratization could best be deepened by bringing policy 
decisions as close as possible to the needs and preferences of the population. 
So decentralization became a popular theme lately and embraced by the donor 
community. As early as 1990, the UN-Rio conference on Sustainable Devel-
opment elaborated “Local Agenda 21” as a speciﬁc program to enhance local 
governance and democracy. Subsequently a consortium of UNDP, FAO, etc 
developed the most elaborated website on the issue of decentralization (http://
www.ciesin.org/decentralization/SB_entry.html). The World Bank from 1995 
up to today dedicated a lot of resources and developed indicators of decen-
tralization (World Bank 1995–2003). The IMF, in conformity to its mandate, 
has a long standing tradition of work on ﬁscal decentralization, however, not 
speciﬁcally dedicated to low-income countries. Intellectually the idea and 
fashion of decentralization is certainly also due to the development of the ide-
as of social capital, where Putnam, in his seminal work “Making Democracy 
Work” eloquently showed that democracy is working best where there is a 
longstanding tradition of local governance and accountability, whereas more 
centralized government produced less results both in economic performance 
as in civic well being (Putnam, 1993). 
If the ideal of local governance and democracy is beyond dispute, the 
outcomes and implementation of decentralization processes are, especially 
in low income countries more problematic. So, before embarking on serious 
decentralization in a low income country and in the context of post-conﬂict, it 
is worthwhile to go into that discussion. 
Therefore, we shall ﬁrst (section 2) give a short overview of concepts 
and a few deﬁnitions, because decentralization encompasses political, admin-
istrative and ﬁscal aspects. At the end of that section we shall concentrate 
on the theoretical discussion on ﬁscal decentralization, where there is a long 
standing discussion on merits and problems. Because most of the discussion 
on ﬁscal decentralization was inﬂuenced foremost by processes in mature 
democratic countries, it did not reﬂect enough the speciﬁc problems of low 6 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05
income countries where human capital and other resources are scarcer. This 
problematique will be tackled in the next section three of this draft. We will 
ﬁrst show that there are speciﬁc concerns for decentralization in LIC’s and 
that there are as many decentralization processes as there are countries and 
that the extent of decentralization, measured by the ratio of sub national 
budget/national budget, is not the only relevant factor to measure successful 
decentralization. Therefore, one should go beyond the ﬁscal decentralization 
debate. The scarce and scanty evidence on decentralization and especially on 
the much heralded better service delivery if local governance and democracy 
prevail, will show us how difﬁcult it is to go for an across the board or “one 
size ﬁts all” decentralization. By then we will have sufﬁcient background to 
develop the next section ( section 4). In that section we will ﬁrst highlight the 
very speciﬁc institutional and historical context in which the debate of decen-
tralization has to be framed. DRC has speciﬁc characteristics which might 
have as a consequence that decentralization has to be tailored to this speciﬁc 
context. Especially the context of a failed state in recovery after a devastating 
conﬂict and with very heterogeneous conditions in terms of populations and 
resources make it a peculiar case. We shall then develop the deconcentration 
politics that existed before the conﬂict and dating back to the law from 1982 , 
before looking at how the new law on decentralization, that is in the making, 
tackles this speciﬁc situation. 
In this central section of the text we shall discuss the new proposal on 
decentralization in DRC formulated in the “Projet de Loi Organique, no. xxx 
Portant Organisation Territoriale et Administrative de la RDC”. It reﬂects 
adequately the new power balance that is laid down in the “Constitution de 
la Transition”. It combines the reﬂection of the new power balance with the 
overall popular sentiment that the country should stand united, notwithstand-
ing its diversity. The unity of the country is reﬂected in the continuation of the 
territorial organization whereby the executive levels of all decentralized units 
are the representatives of/ and appointed by the central state. The reﬂection 
of the new power balance resides in the fact that at the deliberative levels of 
all decentralized units, the heads of the regional and local councils must be 
from another “composante” than the heads of the executive levels. This power 
balance, often seen as a source of discord and potential conﬂict, has also 
proven to be operational, in the sense that it is a way of creating “checks and 
balances” in governance. At the central level it is one of the mechanisms that 
has led to a certain stabilization of the economy through the mutual control 
of using government revenue more correctly and thus to break the “malig-
nant triangle of hyperinﬂation, hyper recession, and hyper depreciation of the 
currency”(Tshiunza, 2003).
This initial statement on the new proposal for decentralization in the 
DRC does however not mean that it cannot be improved or amended. This 
proposal refers very often to the “Constitution de la Transition” meaning that 
it is a transitional proposal, as testimonied by discussions and ongoing pro-
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is for example that the appointment of the legislative councils will not 
be effective before the elections have taken place. If this amendment is 
voted then the characteristics of this new law are twofold. It is ﬁrst a 
law on deconcentration and it regulates thus mainly the administrative 
territorial organization. In this sense the democratic contents of a decen-
tralization is postponed and therefore the law can best be seen as laying 
the foundation for future deepening of the democratic contents of a real 
decentralization. 
2.  Decentralization
2.1.  Concepts and Deﬁnitions
    The literature on decentralization in both the French and the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition distinguishes three levels of decentralization—
political, administrative and ﬁscal— and opposes it to deconcentration 
(Mpinga-Kasenda 1968, Mawhood 1984, Bird 1995). Thus, “decentrali-
zation” means the sharing of part of the governmental power, empowered 
by law, by a central ruling group with other groups each having authority 
within a speciﬁc area of the state. It means that in the units of local gov-
ernment, formal decision-making is primarily exercised by locally rep-
resentative councilors or ofﬁcials. At the ﬁscal level, it means that these 
units have not only a separate legal existence, but also its own budget to 
allocate material resources on a range of issues decided by law. “Decon-
centration” however, implies the sharing of power between members of 
the same ruling group having authority respectively in different areas of 
the state. There the formal decision-making is exercised by centrally ap-
pointed ofﬁcials, who also decide on the allocation of funds to be spent 
locally, stipulated by central government. 
Decentralization is nowadays looked upon as intrinsically valu-
able as opposed to centralization associated with red tape, distant from 
the local needs and preferences. Of course it cannot be denied that de-
centralization, that is associated with devolution of power, whereby there 
is democratic and political decentralization as opposed to bureaucratic 
and administrative decentralization associated with deconcentration, is 
intrinsically better if the preconditions are fulﬁlled. In other words if the 
local scene is not dominated by a small elite, capturing the local ﬁscal 
resources for their own beneﬁt but manned by a capable and accountable 
local government that is well using the transfers of the central govern-
ment and the local tax resources, then decentralization is superior. It may 
however be that the local capacity to govern is still at its infancy stage, 
and that increasing the layers of decision-making without the checks and 
balances, only increase the opacity of government and taps into the al-
ready weak resource base. These are only a few of the preconditions that 
need to be fulﬁlled in the case of LIC’s and that we will develop later. 8 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05
There are also other conditions that need to be fulﬁlled and it is the literature 
on ﬁscal decentralization that warns us that decentralization is only valuable 
for a certain set of functions (allocative efﬁciency) and not for other purposes 
and goals of national policy (income distribution issues and macro-economic 
stabilization). 
2.2.  Fiscal Decentralization
    The standard theory on the responsibility of the public sector 
in economic life distinguishes three functions that cannot be fulﬁlled by the 
market mechanism: (i) stabilization or macroeconomic management; (ii) in-
come distribution concerns; (iii) and allocation of public goods (Musgrave 
1959). It is especially in the latter domain of efﬁcient allocation of public 
goods that the ﬁscal decentralization theory has propped up. 
The whole theory of ﬁscal decentralization – whereby we deﬁne it as 
devolving revenue sources and expenditure functions to lower tiers of govern-
ment – hinges primarily on three theoretical arguments.
•  The ﬁrst goes back to the model of Tiebout (1956), who claimed that de-
centralization leads to greater variety in the provision of public goods, 
allowing for better tailoring of public spending to the needs of the pop-
ulation. In this approach, different local governments offer different 
public tax-expenditure bundles, and mobile individuals are supposed 
to allocate themselves according to their preferences. In that model 
the consumers or electorate “vote with their feet” and change jurisdic-
tions to adapt individual preferences to the supply of public goods by 
different local governments. Different authors have argued forcefully 
that the assumptions required for such a model are very stringent and 
not adapted to the conditions prevailing in most LIC’s. (Bird and Vail-
lancourt, 1999; Bruekner, 2000; De Mello, 2000; Smoke, 2001; and 
Bardhan, 2002 ). We will come back to the arguments of these authors 
in the next section. 
•  The second argument has been developed by Oates (1972 and 1993) and 
Bruekner (1999). Decentralization is to be preferred when tastes and 
preferences are heterogeneous and there are no spillovers to other ju-
risdictions. In that case, decentralized public infrastructure (e.g., local 
roads) and service delivery are better suited to local conditions, there-
fore increasing the effect on growth. If spillovers as in the construction 
of highways, controlling epidemics and pollution, etc, are relevant then 
underprovision of local public goods is possible. 
The potential beneﬁts of devolving ﬁscal responsibilities to lower levels 
of government are believed to lie in the reduced information and transaction 
costs associated with the provision of local public goods. An increase in efﬁ-
ciency in service delivery is believed to be forthcoming because it reﬂects bet-
ter the local differences between regions and localities.(World Bank, 1997).IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05 • 9
The “reduced information and transaction costs” argument has howev-
er been countered lately by the “coordination failures” inherent in increased 
complexity when lower levels of government enjoy greater autonomy, cre-
ated by decentralization policy. (Poterba, 1996; Ter-Minasian, 1999; and De 
Mello, 2000). These coordination failures may induce sub national govern-
ments to spend inefﬁciently and beyond their means, thereby compromising 
macroeconomic stability and waste of scarce national resources. The negative 
characteristics associated with central government, may then be compounded 
by decentralization policies. These “coordination failures” are more prone to 
manifest themselves in the context of weak state structures and LICs. The 
“coordination failure” problematique and the possible effect on the other func-
tions of public ﬁnance (macroeconomic stabilization and distribution cum 
poverty concerns) point to another related problem. The three functions are 
interrelated and the mutual impact need to be taken into account when de-
signing a proposal for decentralization especially when applied to LICs
The instruments of ﬁscal decentralization are the legal provision for 
the decentralization rules, a coordination centre that spells out the different 
rules, monitors and accompanies the vertical relations between the centre 
and the decentralized units and the horizontal ones ruling the relations be-
tween the regions and the different other tiers of the governance structure. 
The ﬁscal decentralization entails also procedures and rules for expenditure 
and revenue raising. There are three different ﬁnancing mechanisms for local 
government: Local taxes, user fees and central government grants.  Ideally 
real ﬁscal decentralization would be that the lower tiers of government are 
responsible for their own decisions on spending in line with their capacity of 
raising local or regional taxes and user fees. User fees is an interesting device 
in making users accountable not to overspend and they are easy to understand. 
They are however not adequate in addressing inequality of access to services, 
therefore local taxes or central grants are more adapted. Ideally local and/or 
regional taxes should be territory bound (e.g., property tax). Since a lot of 
taxes are however better levied on a national scale, lower tiers of government 
will often draw on transfers by the national government. A distinction can be 
made between general grants, assigned revenues, incentive grants and deﬁ-
ciency grants.
General Grants are given without any direction as how they have to 
be spent. They are often calculated on the basis of a formula to take into ac-
count the relative wealth or poverty of each region or locality and its needs for 
local government services. Assigned revenues, prescribed and collected by 
the central government but handed over under strict conditions to the lower 
tiers of government. Incentive grants in order to help local government to 
carry out certain expenditures that have priority , but since these grants do 
only cover part of the cost, local government will have an incentive to use the 
grant efﬁciently. Deﬁciency grants do cover deﬁcits run by local government   
Of course these kinds of transfers do not enhance responsibility by local gov-
ernments. In this context ﬁscal decentralization literature often mention the 10 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05
problem of the danger for macro economic stability if local governments can 
borrow money autonomously. Often, unlike China, most central governments 
then have to rescue local governments and bail them out if they have spent 
far beyond their means. However, this and other problems emerge more often 
in high- and middle-income countries and in certain emerging economies. 
In low-income countries, problems and dangers of ﬁscal decentralization lie 
most often elsewhere. (Mawhood, 1984; Bird and Vaillancourt, 1999; and 
Bardhan, 2002).
2.3.  “Coordination Failures” and Problems of
  Fiscal Decentralization 
   
Coordination failure stems from two sources. First, there are agency 
problems, arising from the delegation of ﬁscal competency to lower levels 
of government, and second, “common pool” problems may arise from local 
expenditure ﬁnanced through central grants. Agency problems are due to the 
asymmetry in information that works in both ways. Central government is 
less close to the preferences and needs of the local population, and that is the 
main rationale for decentralization. On the other hand cost of information is 
going to rise for central government with devolution of ﬁscal power as well 
as a possibility of loss of efﬁciency in tax raising. Thus, if on the expenditure 
side, spending might be more tailored to the need of the population, it is possi-
ble – especially if expenditure at the local level comes through central grants 
– that at the revenue side there is less willingness and efﬁcacy in raising taxes, 
so that the overall tax base may shrink. 
The latter point relates to the other set of possible pitfalls arising from 
decentralization (common pool problems). With revenue sharing, local gov-
ernments have an incentive to minimize own costs (raising local taxes) of 
service delivery, and stimulate overspending, especially if central govern-
ment pay deﬁciency grants. Such free rider behavior and interregional com-
petition for central government grants, can and does lead in a lot of countries 
to a decrease in ﬁscal discipline and overall higher budget deﬁcits. De Mello 
(2000) has found substantial evidence of “coordination failure” leading to 
higher ﬁscal deﬁcits in decentralized settings. Certain authors do question the 
validity that what might be true for developed counties does not necessarily 
hold for low-income countries (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1999). The sample of 
countries chosen by De Mello only contains one sub sahara african country, 
South Africa, and consists of 17 OECD countries and 13 non OECD countries, 
none of them really is a low income country. Is that enough to discard the 
ﬁndings of De Mello? In order to answer that question, let us go into some of 
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3.  Decentralization in Low Income Countries (LICs) 
    A lot of literature on decentralization has emerged in contexts 
of countries such as the United States, European countries or certain middle 
income countries and emerging economies. The picture and accents may be 
very different if decentralization is looked upon in the context of LICs, be-
cause the institutional context is very different as well as the opportunities 
and possibilities of local taxation.
3.1.  Speciﬁc Problems with (Fiscal) Decentralization in LICs
    First, ﬁscal decentralization, has been propagated mainly for its 
capacity of improving allocative efﬁciency by bringing decisions on allocat-
ing local public goods and services closer to the preferences of the popula-
tion. If however the major goal, as formulated in the Millenium Development 
Goals, is to reach and empower the poor, often living in remote areas, then 
success in poverty alleviation is a more important criterion than the efﬁcien-
cy in interregional resource allocation. In other words, because of important 
differentials between regions in opportunities, income and endowments and 
because of low income and human development in general in LICs, the distri-
bution concerns overarch the principle of allocative efﬁciency. This does not 
mean that decentralization is not possible, only that in LICs the poverty and 
distribution concerns have a priority over allocative efﬁciency concerns, or 
should explicitly take into account the interregional differences. 
Another assumption in the literature is that decentralization is intrinsi-
cally a way of checks and balances in order to restrain central government’s 
power. In many LICs however, the poor and the minorities are often oppressed 
by local power groups. If this is so, decentralization may reinforce oppression. 
This argument could however be turned around and depends on concrete his-
torical settings.
Third and related to the ﬁrst problem is the mobility assumption made 
by the decentralization literature. Because of low income, cross jurisdictional 
mobility in order to “vote with their feet” is much less possible in LICs. More-
over, close knit relations in many of the rural communities in poor countries 
would not permit such a behavior since a sharp difference is made between 
“insiders” and “outsiders” making mobility almost impossible.
Fourth, there are a number of related problems that lead to the “coor-
dination failure” arguments that explain how ﬁscal discipline ﬁrst at the sub 
national, then at the national level, decreases after decentralization. They are 
all related with the characteristics and capacities of local government and 
decentralized civil servants. Indeed for decentralization to succeed, the lit-
erature assumes that different levels of government, have similar levels of 
technical and administrative capacity, and sufﬁcient incentives (salaries) to 
perform. These conditions tend to increase with income levels and are par-12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05
ticularly problematic in LICs. The scarcity of capable bureaucrats in LICs is 
further compounded by the fact that in poor countries, information and ac-
counting mechanisms of monitoring these public bureaucracies are equally 
dependant on the level of income. Moreover in poor countries the institutions 
of local democracy and of political accountability are often weak. If this is the 
case, then public goods can be captured by local elites instead of leading to 
the alleged advantages of decentralization being, lower transaction costs and 
better information leading to better provision of public goods. 
As weaker governance on the central and local levels tend to relate to 
income levels, then because of the former arguments, “coordination failures” 
are due to be more prevalent in LICs thereby jeopardizing the already frag-
ile results of macro economic restructuring and poverty alleviation policies. 
Because of the presumed negative impact of “coordination failures” on ﬁscal 
discipline we will tackle this in the following point.
Bird adds another aspect  arising from information asymmetry (1995) 
in LICs and that has to do with the alleged improvement of service delivery by 
decentralization: The central government may not know what to do, the local 
government may not know how to do it. Of course this asymmetry problem 
depends on the kind of service. Local road maintenance, garbage collection, 
street cleaning, local security may not be a problem, but in matters like power 
plants, irrigation systems, tarred roads and public health, expertise beyond 
the reach of local capacity might be necessary. In the former examples, local 
government can be quite capable of doing a better job than central provision 
of these services, in the latter examples decentralization might be problem-
atic. 
3.2.  Lessons learnt 
    For all the above reasons “coordination failures”, “agency and 
information costs” may be more problematic in the context of poor countries. 
Coordination failures may lead to increased budget deﬁcits especially in a 
context of LICs. There, accounting and control mechanisms are weaker and 
regional free riding enhanced because of weak political governance and the 
capture of local public goods and ﬁnance by local elites who may more easily 
dominate weaker sections of the populations. In this case “Efﬁciency gains”, 
which are the main advantages of decentralization, may be dwarfed by the 
challenges of ensuring macroeconomic governance and ﬁscal discipline in a 
decentralized government (De Mello, p.374). 
We have learnt that ﬁscal decentralization may jeopardize macroeco-
nomic stability and, in certain contexts of capture by local elites, poverty alle-
viation. The question is then if decentralization must be discarded altogether 
in the context of LICs. Therefore, one has to go beyond the problematique 
of ﬁscal decentralization, although it narrows, in my opinion, the scope and 
instruments of decentralization in order to safeguard other and may be more 
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The main case for decentralization has two components. Information 
on the local needs and preferences can better be taken into account if local ad-
ministration and government are accountable and capable. Second, through 
that process of accountability, service delivery could be improved. Up to now, 
there still is very little empirical evidence of the link between better service 
delivery and decentralization, examples are scant and might be due to other 
accompanying factors as in the case of Kisenso/Kinshasa (see infra). It is 
astonishing that not more research has gone into that crucial aspect of decen-
tralization (Bardhan, 2002) 
The empirical evidence not on service delivery but on decentralized 
budgets has well been documented. Usually, the ratio of sub national budgets/
central budget is then taken as the measure for decentralization. The article 
of S.Ndegwa on “decentralization in Sub Saharan Africa: A Stocktaking Sur-
vey” (World Bank, 2002) is typical in the sense that good decentralization is 
measured and identiﬁed by large devolution of revenue to the lower tiers of 
government. As Smoke argued convincingly in the comparative case between 
Ethiopia and Kenya, that in the latter case decentralization is more genuine al-
though local budgets are relatively far smaller than in Ethiopia where revenue 
sharing or grants from central government are far higher (Smoke, 2001). The 
more genuine decentralization in Kenya is mainly due to the fact that political 
accountability is far greater in Kenya and linked with own restricted ﬁscal re-
sponsibility and less grants from central government. So more decentralized 
budget does not necessarily mean better decentralization.
Notwithstanding all the problems concerning “coordination failures” 
and information costs, decentralization still retains its informational advan-
tage at the local and regional level and is in principle superior to a centralized 
government depending on the following conditions:
•  There is local political accountability, that is, if local government can 
be elected, controlled, revoked by a majority of the population with 
safeguards for non discrimination of minority groups. However, this is 
a long process that has to be initiated and monitored cautiously.
•  Horizontal redistribution between regions and vertical revenue sharing 
in public goods provision is dependent on needs of the population and 
not on the relative wealth of the regions. These provisions have to be 
regulated by law and coordinated and monitored at a central level.
•  Financial accountability by sub national entities has to be enforced, 
thereby devising instruments that enhance ﬁnancial responsibility and 
penalize free rider behavior
•  If there is one point where literature on decentralization agrees, then 
it is that there is no panacea for a successful decentralization policy. It 
depends on the particular historical trajectory and evolution of institu-
tional environment of each country (Mawhood, 1984; Bird and Vail-
lancourt, 1999) 14 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05
4.  Decentralization in Post-Conﬂict DRC
4.1.  The Speciﬁc Institutional Context and Historic Trajectory
    Since speciﬁcity matters for the form that decentralization could/
should take, we will try to spell out in the following paragraphs these charac-
teristics of the DRC that are important to take into account. 
DRC is a vast and extremely heterogeneous country in terms of nat-
ural endowments, peoples, languages. With a territory 82 times its former 
colonial power and ﬁve times the surface of France, it is an important player 
in the region with an important economic potential (the so-called geological 
scandal). The heterogeneity of this vast territory in terms of endowments and 
peoples is at the same time a problem and an opportunity for decentraliza-
tion. 
A problem, since certain regions are very differently endowed and re-
gional frontiers do not correspond with languages and/or ethnic identity. The 
ﬁrst aspect is a problem since certain regions would, in the extreme case of ﬁs-
cal autonomy, be able to mobilize relative vast amounts of revenue (Katanga, 
Kivu, Bas Congo) whereas other provinces (Equator, Maniema, Bandundu) 
would be largely dependant on agricultural production, which in the context 
of very weak infrastructure puts them at a serious disadvantage. An historical 
example is certainly the case of Gecamines in the seventies. This copper and 
cobalt producing nationalized enterprise, at the apex of its production capac-
ity, was responsible for 70 percent of all earned forex and half of the national 
budget revenue. Extreme ﬁscal decentralization in such a case is a disaster 
nationally. The second aspect of the heterogeneity is that regional borders do 
not coincide with languages and ethnic groups. Only at a very decentralized 
level would one ﬁnd a certain homogeneity that checks for the problem of one 
group dominating another .
The heterogeneity is also an opportunity, because of the complementa-
rities. For instance, the production proﬁle in agriculture between the East and 
the West is highly complementary. The West (Bas Congo, Kinshasa, Band-
undu), because of its lower altitudes, produces very different produce than 
the Kivu and Oriental provinces (De Failly, 2004). With higher altitudes they 
can produce cash and staple food production that the West cannot. To take 
advantage of these relative different and complementary endowments, im-
portant decentralization at the level of provinces is not advisable because of 
the spillover effects (what you need is infrastructure encompassing regions) 
and the heterogeneity of the population. In sum, these peculiar aspects of the 
DRC plead for decentralization in small jurisdictions with limited but real 
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The DRC has known an exceptionally long period of decay of the 
formal economy and the state. Since the mid-seventies, the neopatrimonial 
policies under the regime of President Mobutu, have led to a downward spiral 
where the formal economy has been dwarfed, leading to diminished state 
revenues. The following Table 1 illustrates more than words the economic 
regress and state decay, only comparable to a situation of devastation after a 
long civil war. The formal economy shrunk to almost a third of its value two 
decades ago, with a population that doubled its numbers. Especially the nine-
ties saw the steepest decline. Since government revenue depended, to a great 
extent, on exports and taxation of formal enterprises, the state gradually saw 
its role reduced not only in absolute terms, where own revenue became ridicu-
lously low, but also in relative terms. By 1999 and by way of comparison, the 
total budget of Congo was merely one tenth of that a middle large city in Eu-
rope (e.g., Brussels) for a population 60 times as large. Especially in the nine-
ties, since the national budget had become symbolic, the Mobutu government 
resorted to criminal practices, by using the money press to cover its expenses 
and at the expense of the population who was crushed under a hyperinﬂation. 
Since the state functions and the formal economy were bankrupt, all state 
functions and public goods provision almost disappeared. This has different 
indirect implications for decentralization. Table 1 also shows that the decline 
of the formal economy is not linear, but that a different allocation has been 
realized. The copper and cobalt sector collapsed, so that the weight of the Ka-
tanga province as main industrial region has been overtaken by Kinshasa and 
the Kasai province. Kinshasa because of its concentration of population and 
the salient fact that cement production has substantially risen,  points to the 
regional substitution but also to a shift from international tradables to (quasi) 
non tradables. Indeed, the rise of the cement production within the overall fall 
op GDP points to the partial substitution of the formal sector by the informal 
sector, more directed to local demand and purchasing power. That brings us 
to an important and underrated phenomenon. 
Table 1. Indicators for State and Formal Economy Decay
Unit 1980 1999
Population Millions 27 50
GDP Millions U.S. dollars 14922 5200
GDP Percent of 1980 GDP 100 35
Gov. Expenditure Millions of .US dollars 3870 260
Gov. Expenditure /GDP Percent  26 5
Exports Millions of USdollars 2507 1050
Imports Millions of US dollars 1117 540
Copper 1000 tons 468 (in 1988) 35
Cement  1000 tons 85 (in 1988) 149
Diamond  1000 carat 18163 (in 1988) 26084
Source: Based on World Bank, World Development Indicators and Lukusa, CEDAF, 1999, IFS16 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05
The bankruptcy of the formal economy and the state led to an unprec-
edented informalisation of society. People had to fend for themselves and 
use whatever means they had to survive. The development of the informal 
economy compensated partly (almost half of the loss in GDP-De Herdt and 
Marysse, 1996) for the fall in formal income and employment and guaranteed 
a supply of private goods. The rise of the informal economy, as a popular re-
sponse to the collapse of the formal economy, is spectacular and underrated 
by economists. Spectacular because there are not many countries where only 
ﬁve to ten percent of the active population has a formal job and yet succeed 
in surviving. Underrated because it has not only substituted partially for the 
fall of the formal economy, taking over essential tasks such as feeding and 
transporting the population, but also lying the foundations for local entrepre-
neurship.
The informal economy has however serious drawbacks. The tax base 
had eroded and public goods were non existent except in negative terms. 
Since people in the state sector had to survive, they used their position to earn 
some money by creating all kinds of “informal Taxes”. Even when there was 
no war, soldiers and police created roadblocks to levy “their taxes” on the 
roads. Customs tax at the entry of the country had to be paid informally if 
not, long administrative procedures followed, making Congo infamous for its 
very high “transaction costs” (e.g., transporting coffee from Equator province 
to Kinshasa is more expensive than from the exporting port to any destina-
tion in the World). The transmission mechanism of these “transaction costs” 
followed the same pattern of national politics viz by patron-client relations. 
Whatever venture you wanted to set up, or whatever problem of health or 
education you have, you had to know someone who could help you. Without 
these social links, sometimes horizontal, often vertical patron client relations, 
you are considered as “Mobola” (a poor person because you have nobody 
“to lean on”). Public accountability, necessary ingredient for a successful de-
centralization, has in these circumstances completely disappeared. Restoring 
accountability will be a long task and necessarily passes through a thorough 
reform of the public sector, to start with paying decently those who work. 
Increasing the numbers of civil servants by increasing the number of layers 
of government through complex decentralization must be kept at a minimum 
or only there where political accountability is possible and capture by elites 
minimized. Central government can be monitored by IFIs, local government 
by the population. The intermediary tiers of government however is more 
problematic, since they do not have anymore the informational advantage 
of local government and the problems of capture by dominant elites is much 
more difﬁcult to be set aside and ‘coordination failures’ are more prone to ap-
pear at these intermediary levels. 
Another aspect of the erosion of the tax base is of course that the ﬁg-
ures given by the ministries are totally underestimating the real possibilities 
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If private goods produced by the formal economy can be substituted by 
the informal economy , the substitution of public goods by an informalized 
society is much more difﬁcult. Civil society has taken over different func-
tions of the state and a lot of public goods have been privatized and produced 
by the informal economy. Churches and NGOs have continued to deliver 
services in the area of education and health in extremely difﬁcult situations, 
but coverage was insufﬁcient and overall quality has gone down in view of 
a growing population and shrinking standards of living. The most important 
legacy of this period, especially from 1990 onward, is that people have been 
creative to substitute for a collapsed economy and state, but that awareness 
and collective action has developed on an unprecedented scale, preparing 
the ground for decentralization on a local scale (see experiment Kisenso/
Kinshasa and peaceful resistance by civil society in Bukavu). But there is 
also an important positive national aspect to the growing awareness of the 
civil society. One could, in a “boutade”, sum up the merits of the civil society 
for the country as follows: The nation (civil society and the population) has 
rescued the (unity) of the state, it is now in the post-conﬂict era the responsi-
bility of the state to rescue the population.   
Certain public goods however cannot be substituted by civil society, 
most notably national security and public infrastructure. Zaire/RDC had be-
come a giant on clay feet, formally united but in reality fragmented, because 
the state had failed to procure these two essential elements of a minimal state. 
The failed state, compounded by the spill-over of the Rwandan conﬂict and 
the change in geo-politics, was one of the essential factors leading to the out-
break of the ﬁrst international African war and the de-facto fragmentation 
of the country. Notwithstanding the physical fragmentation of the country, 
there has been a popular awareness and determination that the country could 
not fall apart, in fact it is the population and not the state that has saved 
the nation. This popular determination to stay united is an important factor 
restraining strong regional governments, but again that does not imply that 
decentralization on a local level is not feasible. 
If the West of the country has not suffered too much from the war, ex-
cept during the siege of Kinshasa in august-September of 1998, the costs of 
the war in human suffering and economic costs have been extremely severe. 
We have not yet a full picture of the devastation by the war, but the scattered 
evidence is frightening. The IRC has estimated very roughly that at least 2.5 
million people directly or indirectly have died because of the war. Privileged 
eye witnesses (chef de zone de Santé of Lodja) said that the incidence of 
HIV, because of rape by rebels and invading forces, would have risen from 5 
percent to 25 percent. Agricultural production e.g., in the provinces of Kivu 
because of plunder and population on the run declined further with the war. 
The following Tables 2 and 3 give an idea on the decline in a zone that was 
particularly struck by the war e.g., Masisi.18 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05

















Source: SNSA, / For 2002;  Administration territoriale de Masisi                  
(1)Production  of Millet is that of 1993.











Source: SNSA for 1992 / Data for 2002: l’Administration territoriale de Masisi 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a post-conﬂict country where 
recovery after the war is real but fragile. Table 4 shows that after the war there 
was a remarkable recovery. 
Table 4. Inﬂation and Economic Growth Performance without and with 
IFI intervention
Period Years Inﬂation rate
Annual increase in 
percent
Growth of GDP
Annual change in 
percent
Government of L.Kabila 
With limited ODA





Government of J. Kabila 






Sources:  Ngonga Nzinga , V., “Programme Interimaire Renforcé (PIR) et Evaluation à mi-parcours 
du Programme Economique du Gouvernement (PEG)” in (Notes de Conjoncture), Kinshasa, 
Octobre 2003. IMF, “DRC-Third review Under the Three-Year arrangement Under 
the Poverty Growth Facility and Request for Waiver of Performance Criteria,” EBS 
/04/26, Washington D.C., February 26, 2004, forthcoming on www.imf.org
*projections.
The recovery is real and promising because of internal changes but 
also because of changes by the international community that is not anymore 
bound by the constraints of a cold war. On the political front government of 
president J. Kabila reached an inclusive and global agreement leading to a 
government of national union that would lead to elections within two years. 
On the economic front, the opening of president J.Kabila towards the interna-
tional community and the change in economic direction was a famous depar-
ture from his fathers policies and with the help of the IFI’s and certain bilat-IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05 • 19
eral donors, the country achieved a remarkable macro-economic stabilization 
and for the ﬁrst time in more than two decades some economic growth. The 
change in attitude by the international donor community is also due to the 
change in geopolitics. If IFI’s and bilateral donors have in the past condoned 
patrimonial policies and predatory behavior for reasons of cold war interna-
tional reasons, this is not the case anymore. Monitoring of the international 
community will be much more focused on good governance and look if donor 
efforts do reach the poor. The only draw back there is that donor fatigue, be-
cause of the necessity of a long period of recovery in a difﬁcult environment,   
might lead to a stop and go policy without sufﬁcient time horizon and ﬁnan-
cial means. Although this latter problem, because of the aid pledges of the 
donor community for the coming years, seems to be less of a problem, may 
however prop up when elections are not coming forward or because of the 
political breakdown of the peace agreement.   
The recovery is fragile for different political and economic reasons. 
Political stumbling blocks are easy to discern but difﬁcult to overcome. 
Notwithstanding the very underestimated technical aspects to organize free 
and fair elections in a country as vast and devastated as DRC, a main dif-
ﬁculty is political. One can almost daily refer to situations that endanger the 
fragile political agreement. Distrust is deeply engrained and each dispute be-
tween the former belligerent parties is seen as a possible break up of the peace 
process. However, the speciﬁcity of the new government is that former lead-
ers of rebellion are now together in the capital city and that “centralization” 
of formerly regionally based leaders are forced to look for a compromise and 
permits also mutual “control”. This thwarts the tendency of capture at the na-
tional level, because every composante of the government does not want the 
others to run away with the rents. This is certainly part of the explanation of 
the successful macro-economic stabilization (Tshiunza 2003) This particular 
characteristic of the post-conﬂict arrangements does not plead again for a 
strong decentralization along regional or provincial lines. 
The main economic pitfall jeopardizing a possible sustainable recov-
ery lies in the lack of international trust. As we explained above, the agency 
of the IFI and the government of 
J. Kabila has been instrumental to create the preconditions for an eco-
nomic recovery by bringing down inﬂation, creating a realistic exchange rate 
policy, restoring economic equilibriums and bringing growth. Above all the 
new government has shown that it has resisted the temptation to serve itself 
by using the money press. 
However, only when investment by those Congolese who have their 
money abroad and by serious international investors, comes back, then and 
only then will the recovery be sustained. Up to now very insigniﬁcant amounts 
of private investments have come in. Distrust in the policy is still very great, 
but there are signs of a regained interest in a potentially important country, 20 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05
All those entrepreneurs with some background information know that Congo 
is one of the countries where “transaction costs” are enormous. Bringing ex-
ports crops or bulky products from the hinterland to Kinshasa is more expen-
sive than to ship them to any place in the world. As long as it is cheaper to get 
staple food thousands of miles from abroad instead of a few kilometers from 
the capital city then sustainable recovery will be impossible. These transac-
tion costs are most importantly due to the degradation of the transport infra-
structure but also due to corruption and red tape. These stumbling blocks are 
not insurmountable but will demand still a long pre-investment period by the 
international donor community to lift them, because these are public goods 
that cannot be created by a bankrupt state. 
Seen from this angle ﬁrst priority in order to enhance growth and com-
bat poverty is the restoration of the minimal state by creating infrastructure 
that is far beyond the reach and the interest of one region or province. Because 
of the ranking of priorities, scarce means and because of the spillover effects, 
decentralization along regional or provincial lines can best be kept lim-
ited, while at the same time reinforcing the local decentralization at the 
lower levels and only in partnership with other actors of the civil society 
who are trusted. This will restore credibility in local government.
4.2.  The Deconcentration Policies before the Proposed Reform 
    The legal text that regulate decentralization – in fact this has 
never been a decentralization, but much more a deconcentration – in Za-
ire/DRC is the “Ordonnance-Loi no. 82/006” from February 25, 1982. This 
law regulates the political, territorial and administrative organization of the 
“deconcentration.” The ﬁscal deconcentration rules are regulated by the “Loi 
Financiere no. 83/003” of February 23, 1983, completed by “L’Ordannance-
loi #87-004” of January 10,1987. First we will go into the organizational and 
administrative aspects. In the next point we will analyze the ﬁscal aspects of 
the deconcentration policies followed up to now. 
4.2.1. The administrative organization of the territory or the    
    deconcentration in Zaire/DRC
    The territory of the DRC is organized in seven hierarchical enti-
ties or levels. The ﬁrst is the central state and the second is the level of the 
provinces or regions, as they will be called after the reform. There are 11 
provinces with the capital city Kinshasa included having the status of Prov-
ince and also headed by a “gouverneur.” The only exception to the status of 
Province by Kinshasa is that it has no automatic right on the retrocession of 
10 percent of taxes collected on its territory. Since most of the taxes levied 
are in fact central taxes, it would compound the problem of concentration in 
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On the third level of the administrative hierarchy we ﬁnd the cities and 
the districts. All regional capitals together with six other big agglomerations 
and districts have the status of Entites Administratives Decentralises (hereaf-
ter EAD). The country counts 25 districts. With an average surface of 93,000 
square kilometers—about three times Holland or Belgium—and an average 
population of 1.7 million inhabitants, these entities can be heterogeneous in 
terms of socio-economic characteristics. Some think that this level of ad-
ministrative deconcentration is the relevant level for further decentralization 
efforts, especially as cities are thought of as relevant motors for regional de-
velopment. The rural districts having also the status of EAD seem to be less 
favored  as possible decentralization focal points. The fact that in the newly 
formed provinces—the former Kivu province has been split in three prov-
inces Maniema, North—and South Kivu- districts have been abolished as 
relevant administrative entities, points in that direction.
The fourth level is composed by 145 rural “territories” in rural are-
as and by “communes” in the cities. The capital city counts 24 communes, 
whereas there are 57 communes spread over the country. This seems to be a 
level where decentralization should focus on because it is mostly quite homo-
geneous and is an appropriate level where services could be organized close 
enough to the population, with the exception of rural health centers, primary 
schools and local infrastructure. At the ﬁscal level communes with popula-
tions averaging between 250,000 and 300,000 inhabitants could be able to 
raise some (mainly property) taxes. 
The ﬁfth level is less relevant for ﬁscal purposes but certainly impor-
tant in terms of political decentralization, because it corresponds with the 
core electoral circumscription. These are the “quartiers” at the level of the 
communes and (476) “secteurs” and (276) “chefferies” in rural areas. The 
difference between “secteurs” and “chefferies” lies in the traditional homo-
geneous communities in the case of “chefferies.” When we speak about local 
governance/democracy in the rest of the text, it is mainly at this level that the 
notion is relevant and that people refer to it. It is also at this level that basic 
service delivery can be relevant and viable .
The last two hierarchical levels are found less relevant. In rural areas, 
“secteurs” and “chefferies” are subdivided in “groupements” (5434 for the 
whole territory) and then in “villages.” For the lowest level in service deliv-
ery and poverty, the level of “groupements” can be taken into consideration 
although it is often only certain structures of the churches and NGO that are 
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4.2.2. The importance of the regions (provinces) and its potential  
    ﬁscal capacity
    We already showed in table one the collapse of the formal econ-
omy years before the war began and that was essentially due to patrimonial 
policies and the implicit condoning thereof by the international donor com-
munity. The war was, among other factors, due to the decay of the state and 
its impossibility to guarantee the integrity of national sovereignty. 
Of course what is true for the country is necessary a reﬂection of the 
sum of the regions. However, as we can see from the following tables, region-
al differences are important and their importance is shifting over time. 
Aggregate data especially after 1990 and even simple data as popula-
tion are most of the time estimates. There has not been a population census 
since 1984 and everything is based on projections of data, gathered from 
different sources. “Communes” and “quartiers” have more or less kept books 
and from the 322 “zones de sante” covering the whole territory data on births 
and mortality gave a crude idea on population growth ﬁgures. More problem-
atic are the guestimates of aggregate indicators such as income, that became 
very approximate with the collapse of the formal sector and the growth of the 
informalization of the economy. However, Tables 5 and 6 tell something.
Next to the general regress of the economy the most important shift 
is the concentration of population and income in Kinshasa. Not only has the 
population increased ﬁve times, without any adequate urbanization, but Kin-
shasa has also overtaken the province/region of Shaba/Katanga as the most 
important economic centre. The latter, heavily dependent on one company 
(Gecamines called, the mother and the father of all Katangese people) saw 
its industrial production of copper and cobalt fall to 5 percent of its former 
production capacity in the beginning of the nineties because of widespread 
mismanagement. 
Third not only was there in all provinces an absolute decrease in income, 
long before the war, but the poorest provinces saw their relative inequality 
further increase with time. Indeed these poor provinces, mostly dependent on 
agricultural production and sales, suffered most by the complete degradation 
of the transport-infrastructure. The income gap with Kinshasa grew further 
and consequently the capital city attracted even more people.IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05 • 23
Table 5. Population in regions from 1970 to 1999
Regions Population 1970 
(1000 hab.)




Share in tot.pop. 
2003 in percent
Kinshasa 1,241  6.1 7,274 12.6
Bas-Congo 1,424  7.0 3,267  5.6
Bandundu 2,442 12.0 6,230 10.8
Equateur 2,789 11.2 6,136 10.6
Province Orientale 3,154 15.5 6,798 11.8
Maniema 3,154 15.5 1,333 18.4
Nord-Kivu 5,038
Sud-kivu 4,258
Katanga/Shaba 2,584 12.7 7,599 13.1
Kasai –Oriental 1,770  8.7 5,255   9.1
Kasai-Occidental 2,279 11.0 4,045   7.0
Tot population 20,348 100 57,238 100
Sources: for data on 1970 based on Leon de Saint-Moulin and World Development Indicators 
(WDI) for later data UNDP, Rapport National sur la Pauvreté, WDI, Commission Electoral, 
Ministère des Finances.
Table 6. Income per head and relative economic importance of the re-
gions 1970-99
Regions Income per capita 
1970
Income per capita 
1999 (in $1995)
Share in total income 
1970
Share in total income 
1999 (in $1995)
Kinshasa 1010 323 17.6 39.4
Bas-Congo  420 137  8.3  7.5
Bandundu 171  32  5.8 3.3
Equateur 218 25  6.9 2.6
Province Orientale 187 31  8.2 3.5
Maniema 164  71 7.2 13.3
Nord-Kivu 110
Sud-kivu  67
Katanga/Shaba 1006 138 36.1 17.6
Kasai–Oriental 216  82  5.3  7.2
Kasai-Occidental 152 82  4.8 5.624 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05
If one has to be realistic about decentralization, then one should look at 
different factors in order to assess the means to ﬁnance a sustainable reform. 
Of course decentralization is not in the ﬁrst place “ﬁscal decentralization” 
but it is the motor of a genuine decentralization process that has as a goal the 
empowerment of local populations so that they can broaden their entitlements 
and capabilities (Sen 1999). 
A ﬁrst factor to assess ﬁscal decentralization is to look at what has been 
done in the past. In the following table (Table 7), based on data from the IMF 
and the Ministry of the Interior, we look at what has been budgeted and done 
in the last year where we had full data (2002). Real decentralized expenditure 
to the regions (Kinshasa considered as a province or region included, skewing 
somewhat the reality) reached 18.9 percent of total expenditure of the state. 
The bulk of these US$76 million went to wages, and half of that amount were 
wages paid in Kinshasa (based on appendices 1, 2, and 3).IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05 • 25
Table 7. Deconcentrated budgets in 2002 in million of Congolese Francs
(in million USD**)
Expenditure Revenue
Total state budget (excluding grants and ODA) 168,430 (441) 152,193 (398)
Regional budgets planned (6 regions) 34,831(91) 34,831(91)
Disbursed and spend (estimation)  8,000(21)
Regional budget if all 11regions are included * 38,887(101)
Wages and retirement payments budgeted and 
disbursed (6regions)
23,840(62) 23,840(62)
Wages and retirement payments budgeted and 
disbursed (if 11regions)est.*
25,914(67)
Sources:  based on data** “Ministère de l’Intérieur” (see appendix 1,2,3)**IMF country report 
no. 03/270 p.22-30**exchange rate used (period average 382 FC=1$) IFS 2003, p.302. see also 
paper prepared by Mr. Ghonda (Ministère de l’Economie, des Finances et du Budget of DRC) 
at the international seminar organised in Paris, Oct.2002 on “Relations Intergouvernementales 
et Décentralisation Financière en Afrique Francophone”, Décentralisation Financi1ère : La répart-
tition inégalitaire des ressources et la péréqation. Le cas de la RDC, Paris, oct.2002.
Of course if budgeted means would have been disbursed, deconcen-
trated budgets in the assumption of reuniﬁcation would amount to 37 percent 
of the whole state budget. Different remarks apply. 
First, only wages and retirement payments budgeted seem to be the 
only item that has really been disbursed more or less in line with the foreseen 
amount. No reliable data exist of what has been effectively disbursed e.g. in 
the province of East-Kasai, 34,030 active and retired civil servants received 
together the sum of US$2.7 million or an average annual salary of US$79 , or 
US$6.6 per month. 
Provisional estimates of the Ministry believe that effective disburse-
ment of other budget items, besides salaries paid, is around CF 8000 million 
(US$21 million) in 2002. If one goes into certain details, one can measure the 
rather insigniﬁcant amount going to the regions. Appendix 2 informs us on 
what should have been spent and disbursed to lower tiers of government in the 
regions, the so called EAD (Entites Administratives Decentralisees) . Band-
undu e.g., the most populated province with more than 7 million. inhabitants, 
should have received, as transfers to the lower tiers of government, some CF 
138.5 million or US$3,630,00. That is not $5 cents per person per year. 
In Table 8 (based on appendix 4), we give a synthesis of the ﬁnancial 
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Table 8. Financial Flows between Central Government and the Regions 
in 2002 (CF million)
Regions Kinshasa Bas Congo Katanga East Kasai Others* Total
Tax income to central Gov.  46,332 30,953 9,996 3,707 628 91,616
1. Customs and excise (OFIDA) 16,095 26,025 7,200 3,035 220 52,575
2 .income taxes (DGC) 30,237 4,928 2,796 672 408 39,041
Transfers to regions 31,840
1. wages & pensions 16,070 1220 1,490 1,250 3810 23,840
2. other transfers n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a  8,000(est)
Income from /transfer to (in percent) 288 2537 670 296 16 287
Sources:  Ministries of Finance and the Interior-Appendix 4.* The others here are the re-
gions or “provinces” Bandundu, West Kasai and Equator. The four other provinces (North-Kivu, 
South Kivu together with Maniema , forming one province before 1980, and Oriental Province) 
were under the control of rebellion/invading forces during the war. 
Some interesting features can be deduced from this table. 
First, The capital city, administratively with the status of region, and 
Bas Congo represent about 80 percent of total revenue, mainly because you 
ﬁnd the most important entry-points there with the main export/import port 
and the national airport. Since customs and excise tax income is the most 
important revenue, then of course taxation is concentrated there. 
Second, the other two regions with economic importance, Katanga and 
Kasai provinces are important for their mineral exports that are however less 
and less processed within the country, leaving too little value added in the 
country. Copper and cobalt from Katanga is now mostly exported as “hetero-
genite,” a non processed ore that is mostly informally exported without being 
taxed.Diamonds from Kasai represent on average—since the collapse of the 
copper and cobalt production—60 percent of all exports (on average ofﬁcially 
around US$400 million in the last ﬁve years). However, documented esti-
mates say that total exports are at least US$1,200 million, leaving the country, 
in part by Congo Brazzaville who has almost no production of diamonds, and 
in part by Rwanda and Uganda ( Marysse&Deherdt, 2001)who have no dia-
mond production either. We estimate the part of diamond production leaving 
by the provinces under rebellion/invasion forces at approximately one-third 
of total exports. 
Third, the proportion of the ﬂows between the central government and 
the regions seem to suggest that the central government is extremely central-
ized, but that the poorest regions receive much more than they contribute. In 
a sense that is so and illustrate the point that decentralization in situations of 
important regional inequalities should be corrected by central government. 
Although in the “loi ﬁnanciere” of 1983 explicit provision is made for “pere-
quation” —meaning an equalization fund between rich and poor regions—this 
fund has never been active and the relative redistribution happens through the 
fact that in the poor provinces taxes have not been raised ofﬁcially. However 
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tion effect realized by the mix of centralization/deconcentration is in absolute 
terms not very signiﬁcant. The “centralization bias” of the Congolese govern-
ment is only apparent. An overall restoration of the administrative capacity 
at central and regional level could increase the tax base for both layers of   
government without compromising the redistributive role of central govern-
ment and give more incentives at the regional level in mobilizing taxes, that 
are overall too low, as can be seen from the following examples. 
Fourth, if our rough estimates about legal/illegal exports reﬂect reality, 
then the ﬁscal pressure in the Kasai provinces appears to be less than 1 per-
cent of total value of diamond production only. In other words even in the 
case today, the dwarﬁng of the state and the general informalisation of society 
does not reﬂect a sound degree of taxation and this is may be the only rea-
son why ﬁscal decentralization should also implicate and stimulate regional 
taxation, and have proceeds be split in a way both government entities could 
improve their situation. In fact 10 percent is what is already provided for in 
the “loi ﬁnanciere” but for reasons of “informal taxation” it seems as if there 
is no stimulus at all for levying local taxes. This is only apparent. 
Fifth, the four regions/ provinces that were under rebellion/invaders 
command during the war are not taken into account. The taxation potential 
and therefore ﬁnancing of some potential decentralization is also underes-
timated in the ﬁgures of the table. Not only because the rebellion gave no 
estimates on tax revenue and expenditure, but for the same reason as above. 
An underestimation of tax base, because of the devastated administration over 
the whole of the national territory. An example during the war showed the po-
tential. In the coltan boom of 2000, the rebellion government in South-Kivu 
was able to mobilize US$1million a month by taxing coltan exports represent-
ing e.g. one fourth of all central government expenses to the regions in 2002. 
Sixth, not only the revenue side of regional deconcentration budgets is 
underestimated for all the reasons mentioned above (devastated administra-
tion, informalisation of society, patrimonial policies, etc) but so is the expend-
iture side. Expenditure now reﬂects, as we have seen, only (dismal) payment 
of wages and pensions for the civil servants. What is not accounted for is that 
health and education expenses are paid for more than 90 percent by efforts of 
the parents, local and central actors such as the churches and donors .
In sum, given the poor level of ofﬁcial tax raising regionally, deconcen-
trated budgets are underestimated and could be more substantial. Without an 
improvement in tax raising at regional levels, actual deconcentrated budgets 
dismally low as they might seem, are already too high in view of the numer-
ous other priorities that the government has to take up. Does that mean that 
decentralization has no sense nor scope? No, but it will have to be very gradu-
ally introduced.
If we assume that the level of government ﬁnance could be restored at 
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widens. Teachers, nurses, medical assistants and doctors, etc could again be 
paid normally and not forced to use “tricks” to earn a decent living. Especial-
ly a return to less overall insecurity and uncertainty would diminish the now 
prevalent levels of what is called corruption or “le mal Zairois/Congolais.” 
Indeed high levels of uncertainty sparks off a behavior of “taking whilst you 
can.” It would however be very unwise to bank on such a potential increase 
for decentralization and not learn from previous mismanagement. If there 
is one thing to be learnt, then certainly it is that the state should cooperate 
and delegate certain functions and service delivery to other actors of civil 
society. In other words, what holds for the private sector and the necessity of 
privatization of private goods and services, holds for delegation to actors of 
the civil society for certain public goods (education, health services, poverty 
alleviation). That does not mean that the government should not coordinate 
or regulate. As in the sphere of  production, it does not mean that the govern-
ment should not regulate and intervene in the production of certain goods or 
services. In the case of natural monopolies or scarce natural resources with 
national interest there are externalities, that begs for the intervention of a 
responsible state. Unfortunately , up to now , these well documented cases of 
necessary state intervention have often been abused as an excuse for preda-
tory behavior. 
In sum, the country in view of the numerous priorities and the paucity 
of their own budget in the medium term, the decentralization effort shall pref-
erably have the following ingredients:
•  More centralization in order to desenclave the poorest regions. Be-
cause of the spillover effects of that ﬁrst priority, this will have to be 
organized on a supra regional level. 
•  More  realism  in  the  tasks  of  decentralized  administration.  The 
stipulations foreseen in the “Ordannance-Loi “of 82-83 and 87 over-
stretch the tasks of the regional and local governments. 
•  More partnership with these structures that are ﬁrmly grounded in 
local structures, e.g., provision of health services can also be better 
continued along the lines of the national health system in “zones de 
sante.” There are 322 zones de sante spread evenly over the whole ter-
ritory. For reasons of equity this system has to be continued, organized 
by the Ministry of Health, but as proved by numerous examples, best 
in partnership with the structures of the churches and NGO’s, which   
are the structures in which people at subnational levels have most trust. 
The same holds for education at the local levels. More partnership also 
with central government in terms of ﬁnding ways of creating more in-
centives for tax raising at the regional level by sharing revenue systems 
for solidarity with poorer regions but at the same time beneﬁting the 
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•  More  genuine  local  democracy  at  the  lower  tiers  of  government 
(quartiers, secteurs, chefferies)
In the next section we shall discuss the new proposal for decentraliza-
tion and try to evaluate it in the light of theoretical insights highlighted in the 
former sections.
4.3.  The New Law on Decentralization
4.3.1. Characteristics of the proposed law on decentralization
    A new proposition of law on decentralization  is being discussed 
in the parliament called “Projet De Loi Organique no....Portant Organisation 
Territoriale et Administrative de la Republique Democratique du Congo”. 
The new law is a combination of continuity in the territorial organiza-
tion together with a reﬂection of the new power relations that emerged from 
the peace agreement of Pretoria and a willingness to rationalize and clarify 
the competences of the different tiers of government. In Table 9, we show a 
synthesis of the territorial organization that reﬂects the administrative hierar-
chy and the logic of organization largely based on criteria of population and 
surface. 
As we have seen, DRC is subdivided in 11 regions or Provinces, with 
the capital city Kinshasa as the eleventh or ﬁrst province. The ten other prov-
inces are those already mentioned in the table 5 and 6. They have around 6 
million inhabitants and are the ﬁrst level of decentralization with the juridical 
status of “Entites Administrative Decentralise” (EAD). This juridical status 
means that these decentralized units have a separate legal personality and 
have a certain ﬁscal autonomy in that they can levy own taxes and raise rev-
enues. All EAD have also two levels of organization, an executive level and a 
deliberative level. The executive level means that the central state designates 
and nominates the head of the decentralized unit as the representative of the 
central state. The deliberative level consist of a counsel where members are 
designated as representatives of the decentralized units. 
The capital city is subdivided in 24 “communes” whereas provinces 
are subdivided in cities (Villes) and districts in the rural areas without major 
cities in its administrative circumscription. These cities called “Villes” is an 
important local  level where there is a concentration of social, economic and 
public activity and with a substantial concentration of population (see Table 
9). The “communes” in Kinshasa and the “villes” in the regions have also 
the status of EAD and with the same attributions and competences on their 
territory as all EAD but under the authority of the higher tiers of govern-
ment. Districts, who continue to lose importance as decentralized units do 
not have the status of EAD, but are called “Entites Deconcentres” without 
legal personality and just as an administrative circumscription with limited 
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Level Capital = Province Region
National Kinshasa Urban Rural
ﬁrst level State
total surface 2.345.000 km2
total population 55 millions
second level Capital city Provinces
number of units 1 10
juridical status EAD EAD
average surface 235.000 km2
average population 6,3 millions 4,9 millions
third level Villes Districts
number of units 16 25
juridical status EAD ED
average surface 93.000 km2
average population 340.000 1.7 millions
fourth level Communes Communes Territoires
number of units 24 57 145
juridical status EAD EAD EAD
average surface 16.000 km2
average population 260.000 95.000 300.000
ﬁfth level Quartiers Quartiers Secteurs /
Chefferies
number of units 476/261










Table 9 Territorial Organization, surface and  population
EAD:   Entité administrative décentralisée: decentralized unit with legal personality
ED:   Entite Deconcentre: deconcentrated unit without legal personality and little
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the Kivu province was subdivided in three new provinces in 1988,  then the 
district level there was abolished. The 16 “Villes” in the regions are further 
subdivided in 57 “communes,” whereas the 25 rural districts are split in 145 
“Territoires.” Both decentralized units have EAD status. As can be seen in 
Table 7, population in these decentralized units range from hundred to three 
hundred thousand inhabitants. 
Both Urban “Communes” and “Territoires” in rural areas are respec-
tively subdivided in “Quartiers” and “secteurs/Chefferies.” The latter decen-
tralized units are called secteurs, when in the rural areas the socio-ethnic 
diversity is still great, whereas a “Chefferie” has a more homogeneous popu-
lation. These rural decentralized units have, in contrast with the “Quartiers,” 
EAD status, and here it is the traditional chiefs that are recognized by the 
central authority that are the head of the executive level. In other words not 
appointed by the central authority as is the case of the other decentralized 
units. The “quartier” as well as the district and the two levels below the “Sec-
teur/Chefferie” viz. “Groupements” and “villages” are not considered as de-
centralized units, but only as deconcentrated units with mainly administra-
tive competences.
The new proposal contains four new features that were absent in the 
former legal texts on the administrative organization of the Congolese terri-
tory. 
•  First and foremost this is a text that reﬂects the new power relations 
resulting from  the political peace agreement between the belligerent 
parties. The “Global and Inclusive Agreement” found its legal expres-
sion in the Constitution of the Transition. Since two of the four compos-
ing parties (composantes) controlled militarily part of the territory they 
of course have a stake in a kind of ‘recognition’ of the regional reality. 
Therefore the new law is a compromise between  the willingness of 
unity and the reality of regional based powerbases. The head of the ex-
ecutive power at the different decentralized levels is the representative 
of and appointed by the central state (on proposition of the minister of 
the interior and appointed by the president-art14-79-150). The head of 
the deliberative counsel however must be from another “composante” 
than the head of the executive power (art.40-100-129-166). This kind 
of “checks and balances” has proved to be operational at the national 
level e.g. in the control of expenditure and inﬂation. Will it work at 
the decentralized levels? The idea is certainly that all decisions at the 
regional and local levels are known and that, in the absence of public 
accountability based on the outcome of an electoral process, the main 
form of accountability that is included in the new proposal. Of course if 
the administration would function correctly, then that would be another 
form of accountability.
•  The next most important feature is a consequence of the ﬁrst and that 
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els. In the accompanying justiﬁcation of the new proposal it is said 
that: “Ce projet de loi etablit une equation entre le transfert des compe-
tences et le transfert reel des resources. Il instaure une harmonie entre 
les textes anterieurs...et la loi ﬁnanciere en cette matiere” (Projet de 
loi, 2004, p.9). The new proposal enables all lower tiers of government 
with the status of EAD to deﬁne and raise taxes in all matters that are 
not taxed by central government, as well as to borrow money and to 
take participations in companies operating in their territories (art..37-
95-132-209) . However these regional and local loans and taxes other 
than those who were already in their attributions, must be accepted by 
the minister of the interior and only acknowledged by the ministry of 
ﬁnance. It is the article 280 that sums up all the possible and impressive 
number of sources of decentralized income. The possibility to contract 
loans, take participations in companies did already exist in the former 
“loi ﬁnanciere no.83-003”amended by “l’Ordannance-loi no 87-004”of 
1987 art.9 but was much more restricitve. In that former law a special 
law had to be voted before  regional or local governments could actu-
ally make loans to ﬁnance capital outlays or it had to be permitted by 
presidential decree. The present law relaxes the stringent conditionality 
that was limiting ﬁscal autonomy. 
•  The new proposal has certainly the merit of determining with more 
clarity the attributions and competences of each level of decentralized 
government and the “division of labor” between the central and the 
decentralized units. (art.15-37-82-96-132-151-170 et le titre II from art. 
245 to 279).
•  Finally there is also a light rationalization exercise in that certain levels 
are considered less important together with a recognition of levels of 
local government that can play a more signiﬁcant role in future by giv-
ing them the status of EAD. Thus districts have lost their status of EAD 
and have as ED (deconcentrated units) received a role of inspection and 
evaluation of the lower tiers of government. This is very much in line 
with the former tendency of abolishing that level of government when 
the old province of Kivu was split in three new provinces (Maniema, 
North Kivu and South Kivu). The inverse tendency happened with 
the “Communes” and the level below that of the “Secteurs/Chefferies.” 
These levels, who are a reality and where government can still be close 
to those governed and at the same time constitute a viable level of  pos-
sible service delivery, have received the status of EAD and obtain more 
attributions, competences and can raise local revenues. 
4.3.2. A need for clariﬁcation
    Although the law has brought some clariﬁcation especially in the 
competences and attributions of the different layers of decentralized govern-
ment, there are still some areas of the proposal that are unclear. One such an 
area is in the political sphere, the other is in the domain of the ﬁscal autonomy 
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The command and head of the different lower tiers of government are 
representatives of the state and mostly proposed by the ministry of the interior 
and ofﬁcially nominated by the president. This holds for all levels of the EAD 
except for the head of “secteurs/chefferies” where it is the customs who deﬁne 
the head of these entities but must be accepted by central government. Since 
the minister of the interior and the president have to intervene in the process 
of appointing the governors, mayors, bourgmestres, “chefs de territoires” it 
is to be expected that there will be some political equilibrium exercise in the 
spread of these functions over the different “composantes” of the transitional 
government, although the minister of the interior has here a great discretion-
ary power. Unclear is the way in which people are chosen to seat in the delib-
erative counsels at the different levels. The new law proposal determines the 
maximum number of members for each deliberative council and mentions 
that the head of the provincial-, city-, commune-, territoire-, secteur/cheffer-
ies-councils, must be of another ‘composante’ than the head of the executive 
power (e.g. art 34). One might wonder what that means at the lowest levels, 
but more fundamentally it is here that a possible problem may arise. Not only 
are the council members not elected, but they can well be members of a same 
group without any representative quality except of being from a particular 
region or locality. Given the high discretionary powers in ﬁscal affairs and 
the fact that a simple majority can decide on all matters of regional or local 
importance, the possibility of capture at the regional or local level is possible. 
No checks and balances at this level thus. 
The other domain of possible confusion and contradiction is that of 
the ﬁscal autonomy of the lower tiers of decentralized government. One de-
termining the ﬁscal attributions of the different levels of the EAD there is 
always reference to the “Loi ﬁnanciere no.83-003 du 23 février 1983, telle 
que modiﬁée et completée par l’Ordonnance-loi no. 87-004 du 10 janvier 
1987” who seems still the law governing ﬁnancial attributions, obligations 
and regulations (see e.g. art. 37-132). However, in this “loi ﬁnanciere” article 
9 explicitly forbids the possibility of lending and borrowing as well as par-
ticipating in companies, except  under very stringent conditions. And article 
16 of this same law stipulates limitatively the taxes that can be levied by the 
lower tiers of government. The new proposal departs from these two funda-
mental limitations of ﬁscal autonomy by lower tiers of government. However, 
there is a loophole in the loi ﬁnanciere that stipulates that only a law is able to 
change these provisions. If our reading is correct that means that the “loi ﬁn-
ancierè holds except if the new law on decentralization stipulates otherwise. 
The accompanying text on “motivation” of the new law, seems to subscribe 
this latter view. We get a summary of the ﬁscal competences of the decentral-
ized levels of government in article 280 of the new law where the impressive 
list of possible taxes and income sources of the different EAD’s is listed. To 
see a possible impact of ﬁscal autonomy, possible contradiction and need for 
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Article 280
 
Sans préjudice des autres dispositions légales ou réglementaires, notamment la loi 
ﬁnancière, les recettes des Entités Administratives Décentralisées proviennent de : 
(a)  produits des contributions et taxes sur les matières non imposées par l’Etat ;
(b)  revenu du patrimoine ;
(c)  recettes administratives rattachées aux actes générateurs dont la
    décision relève de leur compétence ;
(d)  emprunts dans les limites et conditions ﬁxées par la loi ;
(e)  taxes de consommations sur les matières non taxées par l’Etat ;
(f)  additionnels sur certains impôts de l’Etat ;
(g)  rétrocession aux Provinces, de 30 pour cent des recettes générées par    
  les Régies ﬁnancières2 ;
(h)  subvention de l’Etat aux Entités Administratives Décentralisées pour
  couvrir les dépenses d’intérêt général ;
(i)  redevances sur les produits ci-après :
  •  40 % sur les produits miniers,
  •  40 % sur les produits forestiers,
  •  40 % sur le café,
  •  40 % sur vente de l’électricité à l’étranger ;
(j)  produits des contributions et taxes ﬁscales ci-après cédées par le Pouvoir
  Central aux Entités Administratives Décentralisées :
  •  contribution personnelle minimum,
  •  contribution foncière tant des personnes physiques que morales,
  •  contribution réelle sur les véhicules,
  •  taxes spéciale de circulation routière,
  •  contribution sur les revenus locatifs des personnes physiques et des
    entreprises à caractère local,
  •  contribution professionnelle sur les bénéﬁces et proﬁts des petites et
    moyennes entreprises (PME),
  •  contribution professionnelle sur les rémunérations dues par les employés
    œuvrant dans les entreprises à caractère local,
  •  contribution exceptionnelle sur les rémunérations des expatriés dues    
    par les entreprises à caractère local,
  •  droit d’accises ou de consommation sur les produits fabriqués par les
    entrepises à caractère local ;
(k)  recettes provenant du fonds de péréquation.
The regional and local taxes and revenues in principle ﬁnancing these 
levels of decentralized government before the law consisted mainly of g), h), 
j) and k). This is in principle because as we have seen very little ﬁnally was 
realized. e.g. the “fonds de Perequation “ that had to ﬁnance capital outlays 
for the poorer provinces has never been implemented. Even with the existing 
regulations before the new law, different possible problems of interpretation 
persist, e.g. Under i) who and when is a company considered local. Since most 
companies have some spatial location that means that long disputes can and 
do exist on which level is competent for the taxation. In principle, if the “loi 
ﬁnancière” holds and the central government is already taxing, then lower 
tiers could not. But then lower tiers can now use article 280 f). 
New sources of imposition of taxes are the points a), b), c) ,d),e), f) and 
i). Especially the latter point needs clariﬁcation. We understand that this point 
is meant to give a ﬁnancial base to almost each province but what does “re-
devance sur les produits de 40 percent” means? Is it 40 percent on the proﬁt, 
on the Value Added or on the total value of the production?
2 These taxes have existed before 
1996  and  are  now  again  intro-
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Lastly if all levels of  decentralized government have these attributions, 
an enormous amount of uncertainty for households and businesses can arise 
if all these levels are implementing these articles on ﬁscal autonomy. There is 
an article that stipulates that by decree the relations between the different lev-
els of government will be regulated, it opens up an enormous space of (legal) 
disputes over who decides what. It is certainly not a tax environment that will 
incite local and other entrepreneurs to invest or declare activities. 
4.4.  Evaluation of the Decentralization Policies After the
  Adoption of the New Law.
    An evaluation of the possible effects of a new law on decentrali-
zation can only be made if hold against criteria to assess decentralization. In 
the ﬁrst three sections of the paper we tried to spell out that a good decentrali-
zation law should consider at the same time some general lessons drawn from 
the literature on decentralization and before all take into account the speciﬁcs 
of each country. Since the DRC is a LIC and recovering from a conﬂict and a 
long period of decay of state and economy one should be very cautious . From 
this cluster of preconditions to assess a proposal of decentralization in such a 
context we can draw the following criteria: 
1.  There is an informational superiority of decentralization over centrali-
zation and deconcentration if one is anxious to bridge the gap between 
the delivery of local  public goods and the needs and preferences ex-
pressed at the local level. This is only so if local government reﬂects 
the needs and preferences of the population, serves the people and not 
itself. In other words if local government is legitimized, accepted and 
accountable both for central government and local constituency. More 
democracy at the local level thus. 
2.  Allocative efﬁciency, allegedly better accommodated through decen-
tralization,  has  no  priority  over  the  redistributive  and  stabilization 
functions of economic intervention by the state. Especially in very het-
erogeneous countries with regions that are unequally endowed, ﬁscal 
autonomy should balance between creating incentives at the regional 
level for improving regional taxation without jeopardizing the neces-
sity for interregional solidarity.
3.  Decentralization laws should not overstretch the role of the state and 
certainly not of lower tiers of government because of lack of human 
and material resources. In other words it should be realistic.
4.  In a post conﬂict country such as the DRC, a decentralization effort 
has to recognize the underlying reality of the conﬂict without jeopard-
izing the necessity of the reconstruction of the minimal functions of the 
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5.  The long decay of the state has in formalized all spheres of society with 
long lasting consequences. In as far as this informalization has substi-
tuted for public goods, especially in the areas of health and education, 
this should be recognized by the (local) government. Institutionalized 
partnership with civil society in these areas will help to attain a real-
istic and more democratic decentralization. 
The ﬁrst criterion to evaluate a proposal of decentralization is its dem-
ocratic content. This is not only because democracy can be valued as such 
and preferred over authoritarianism (Sen., 1999). The main reason lies in the 
fact that without accountability from the local or regional government the 
advantage of decentralization disappears. Indeed a better match between lo-
cal preferences and service delivery at these levels, leading to higher citizen 
welfare is only possible if preferences can be voiced and taken into account. 
Without the possibility of revocation of local or regional council members and 
executive authorities it is impossible to know if local /regional government 
serves itself or the general interest. One could argue that the capture of rent is 
equally possible by heavy centralization. That is so, but the monitoring by the 
international donor community (in particular the IMF) is easier in the case of   
one central government than in the case of more than 700 EAD.
We explained in the section on the features of the proposal on decen-
tralization that it was foremost a proposal that accommodates the different 
“composantes” of the peace agreement and that must be seen as a transitional 
proposal. Nowhere in the proposal does the law go beyond the territorial or-
ganization and is the democratic content at whatever level non existent. One 
could object that there are deliberative councils at each level of decentraliza-
tion. We have shown that a mere representation of people from the territory 
is not sufﬁcient for popular representation and that it can even be at the detri-
ment of the population since there can be cooptation and domination by one 
group leading to the problem of capture discussed in the literature (Bardhan, 
2002).
Second, the advantage of decentralization from an economic welfare 
point of view , was the superiority of allocative efﬁciency realized through 
genuine decentralization. However, in low income countries and countries 
with high disparities in regional endowments and wealth, ﬁscal autonomy 
should be restrained, because of the overarching priority of the other two 
functions of the state, being stabilization and redistribution. The new propos-
al gives in principle a large ﬁscal autonomy to the regions which can jeopard-
ize these two functions. The stabilization function because the decentralized 
units can contract loans and run deﬁcits hoping to be bailed out by central 
government in case of payments difﬁculties. Since the monitoring of the cen-
tral government by IMF can still be done at national level. If in principle more 
than 700 decentralized units in DRC with EAD status could run deﬁcits then 
the monitoring would be impossible. The redistribution function of the state 
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regions needed to be disenclaved in order to cope with the isolation of their 
markets and the huge transaction costs. The necessity of opening up and inte-
grating the vast territory is beyond the scope of individual regions and must 
be tackled on a national scale. Too many resources kept at the regional level as 
is in principle envisaged by this new proposal would be counterproductive for 
the reuniﬁcation of the country. An important comparative advantage of the 
DRC is lying in its interregional complementarily and that potential can only 
to be realized at the supra-regional level. The proposed ﬁscal decentralization 
is in this sense counterproductive. 
A third criterion for evaluation is to see if the proposed reform is re-
alistic. The new law is on a political level realistic (see fourth criterion), but 
in terms of the attributions and competences of the different levels of de-
centralized government and in the technicality of the implementation quite   
unrealistic. First it overstretches the role of the different levels of government. 
If one looks into the different competences of the EAD (art.245 to 280) then 
one can see how the inheritance of the Mobutu regime is still very present. 
There the state is not only omnipresent but is the almighty and unique actor 
of steering and commanding development  it does not recognize sufﬁciently 
the limitations of the state and the new role of the state in the development 
process. The whole new ideas on the division of labor between the different 
institutions and actors of development (state, markets and civil society e.g. in 
World Development Report, 1997) have not inﬂuenced the architects of this 
law. The idea that the state can and must do things that markets and civil so-
ciety cannot and vice versa, must still make its way. The other bottlenecks in 
the implementation of the new proposal on decentralization is more technical. 
First some slightly more than 700 EAD have all to be manned by competent 
people if this is to succeed. We think that speciﬁc training courses for execu-
tive personnel need to be organized in order to prepare for this task. A greater 
difﬁculty and illustration of the unrealistic character of the law is the aspect 
of the ﬁscal autonomy laid down in article 280 fully quoted above. It is be-
lieved that by increasing the number of taxes and revenues, the decentralized 
units will be able to ﬁnance itself. From tax literature and the reality of de-
centralized taxation in Congo before the law, this will only lead to more eva-
sion and sources of “debrouillardise” and corruption. The multiplication of 
taxes at the decentralized levels not only opens a space of  discretionary 
power that risks to crush every citizen or business initiative, it is moreo-
ver counterproductive in terms of  tax raising because the incentives to 
evade taxes will, if possible, increase by the overwhelming cascade of 
taxes. Decreasing the number of taxes and more transparency in order to cre-
ate more legal security and diminish local discretionary power is absolutely 
necessary. In the interest of both the decentralized units and the citizens, ar-
ticle 280 should be thoroughly scrutinized and simpliﬁed, otherwise it will 
be perceived as a means of capture by the state and the decentralized govern-
ment. The last aspect reﬂecting the fact that the reform has not been thought 
through in all its aspects is the cost of the of the operation. Since the level of 
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tralized units. In these units the central government has to pay the salaries of 
the executive level. Is that accounted for?
The fourth criterion was a more political one, judging the decentrali-
zation proposal from the perspective of a post conﬂict situation. Does the pro-
posal strike a balance between the need for unity and the recognition of the 
diversity of the country and the demand for more regional autonomy. Here the 
score is more nuanced. First the new proposal reﬂects well the balance of the 
new power relations that resulted from the peace agreement laid down in the 
“Constitution de la Transition.” We have seen that, however intricate, the new 
balance realized a certain level of “checks and balances” at the national level. 
As we have seen the same idea has been repeated at all levels whereby the de-
centralized executive power are the representative of the central government, 
but that at the deliberative level the head of the regional and local councils 
must then be from another composante. Although in the absence of elections 
this seems to be the only viable transitional way to strike the balance between 
the different “composantes,” it is not sure if that that will necessarily be so at 
the regional level, where one composante can co-opt many of its clients in the 
deliberative councils of the decentralized units. This can be a source of much 
frustration at the regional and local levels. 
Finally since the speciﬁcs of a country are important in deﬁning and 
tailoring decentralization proposals, we pointed out the necessity for part-
nership. Decentralization proposals should recognize that during the long 
period of decay of the state, most efforts of education and health-service pro-
visions have been dealt with, without state support. At the demand side par-
ents and social networks have taken care that the children, the sick and the 
disabled could go to school or treated or helped, whilst at the supply side, or-
ganizations of the civil society mainly, churches, NGO’s, informal networks, 
public/private ventures have taken the initiative to organize and produce these 
services, although all this was in the attributions of the government. We do 
not see how they would all of a sudden, because of decentralization, be able to 
reverse  this tendency. In the new proposal, not one word on this recognition 
of a new reality that the state was incapable to deliver. Instead of building on 
the experience of the past we only have a proposal that makes the same mis-
take as in the past only repeated at all the decentralized levels, Moreover there 
was no systematic thought on the speciﬁcity of the different public goods that 
have to be produced and how that impacts on the decentralization. Production 
and distribution of electricity is another story than garbage collection. What 
is the right level to deal with producing electricity? May be production should 
be treated at the central level with some elements of privatization. Even if we 
accept that the distribution side of electricity and  water is a public good, then 
what is the appropriate level of decentralization? The same goes for schooling 
and education. If primary schools and professional schools need little regula-
tion from the central government level, the same is less true for higher levels 
of education and must be dealt with at appropriate levels of decentralization. 
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characteristics, be a combination of centralized and decentralized efforts. Lo-
cal health centers can be handled at the local level but e.g. epidemic control, or 
combating the sleeping sickness can only be effective at a national or regional 
level. etc.40 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05
5.  Concluding remarks
    The new proposal on decentralization in the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo (DRC), formulated in the “Projet de Loi Organique Portant 
Organisation Territoriale et Administrative de la République Démocratique 
du Congo” reﬂects adequately the new power balance that is laid down in the 
“Constitution de la Transition”. It combines the reﬂection of the new pow-
er balance with the overall popular sentiment that the country should stand 
united, notwithstanding its diversity. The unity of the country is reﬂected in 
the continuation of the territorial organization whereby the executive levels 
of all decentralized units are the representatives of/ and appointed by the 
central state and in common agreement between the different parties to the 
peace agreement, the so-called “composantes“ of the transitional government. 
The reﬂection of the new power balance resides in the fact that at the leg-
islative levels of all decentralized units, the heads of the regional and local 
councils must be from another “composante” than the heads of the executive 
levels. This power balance, often seen as a source of discord and potential 
conﬂict, has also proven to be operational, in the sense that it is a way of creat-
ing “checks and balances” in governance. At the central level it is one of the 
mechanisms that has led to a certain stabilization of the economy through the 
mutual control of using government revenue more correctly and thus to break 
the “malignant triangle of hyperinﬂation, hyperrecession, and hyperdeprecia-
tion of the currency” (Tshiunza, 2003)
This initial statement on the new proposal for decentralization in DRC 
does however, not mean that it cannot be improved or amended. This proposal 
refers very often to the “Constitution de la Transition” meaning that it is a 
transitional proposal, as testimonied by discussions and ongoing proposals 
for amendment at the parliament. One of these important amendments is for 
example that the appointment of the legislative councils will not be effective 
before the elections have taken place. If this amendment is voted then the 
characteristics of this new law are twofold. It is ﬁrst a law on deconcentration 
and it regulates thus mainly the administrative territorial organization. In this 
sense the democratic contents of a decentralization is postponed and therefore 
the law can best be seen as laying the foundation for future deepening of the 
democratic contents of a real decentralization.
First, why is this – if one measures the proposal against the thrust in the 
literature – not really a law on decentralization? The ultimate argument for 
decentralization over centralized government is its informational supremacy 
in order to enhance the quality of life of citizens in those matters that can be 
delegated to lower tiers of government. Indeed, local government can bet-
ter respond to the needs and preferences of its citizens if it is close to those 
governed. However, this alleged supremacy of decentralized over centralized 
government hinges on two crucial assumptions:
•  There must be a clear deﬁnition of what can be delegated at lower tiers 
of government. We have seen that the score of the new proposal on this 
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cratic control at lower levels of government. Indeed the “communes” 
and the “secteurs/ chefferie,” two political and popular relevant enti-
ties, obtain the status of EAD (Entités Administratives Décentralisées). 
On the inconclusive side, there is no clear delimitation on technical 
grounds what kind of service delivery of (local) public goods can be 
organized/produced at what level of decentralization, e.g. garbage col-
lection or electricity distribution needs clearly different levels of deci-
sion making and organization.
•  Most important however, is that this supremacy of decentralized gov-
ernment is only guaranteed if the executive and legislative levels of the 
decentralized units are considered legitimate or democratically con-
trolled, and accountable. We have seen that this is not yet the case. In 
the proposed law, the possibility of capture of government “rents” by 
co-opted elites at the decentralized levels is possible.
Second, the proposed law has aspects of ﬁscal decentralization where 
it is problematic. The motivational text accompanying the proposal of law on 
decentralization, stresses that the main reason of the proposal was to reach an 
adequacy between the (very extensive and large) attributions of the decentral-
ized units and the ﬁnancial means to ﬁnance these activities. In other words 
there is ﬁscal decentralization although the agreement of the higher tiers of 
government is still necessary to engage in borrowing and new forms of taxa-
tion at the decentralized levels. Especially the impressive amount of (new) 
taxes added to the already existent taxes risks to be very counterproductive. 
We know that the overall level of ofﬁcial taxation and income in DRC is 
not high ( 8% or GDP). The “informal taxation” is however important and 
a source, because of its discretionary application, of high transaction costs 
thereby depressing most formal economic activities and initiatives. Increasing 
the number of taxes, increases the legal insecurity and discretionary power of 
all kinds of administrations thereby increasing tax evasion. Therefore the pro-
posals for ﬁscal decentralization, instead of increasing ofﬁcial revenues, will 
depress even further the ofﬁcial taxation and thus continue to drive people in 
the informal sector. Article 280 of this proposed law needs thorough rethink-
ing together with the articles on the possibilities of regional borrowing and 
participation in local enterprises and ventures .
A last comment on the ﬁscal decentralization proposal is that it risks to 
jeopardize the other functions of government intervention, e.g. the stabiliza-
tion and redistributive function of the state. Indeed, if the law permits that 
decentralized units deﬁne themselves their own tax base and are allowed to 
borrow, this can destabilize all efforts of ﬁscal balance or good governance at 
then national ﬁscal level. On the redistributive side, in a country like the DRC 
with large regional differences in endowment, ﬁscal autonomy could lead to 
an underinvestment and underdevelopment in the poorer regions of the coun-
try. In a post-conﬂict stage of its development it is important not to jeopard-
ize the fragile re-found economic stability and to reconstruct the country by 
creating complementarity between regions rather than by ﬁnancing divergent 
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R E P U B L I Q U E
C E N T R A F R I C A I N E
C A M E R O U N
S O U D A N
REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGOKIN B/C BAN EQUA KAT K/OR K/OC N/K S/K MAN P/O Total
Territoire et population (1)
Superﬁcie (milliers de kilomètres carrés) 10.0 53.9 295.7 403.3 496.9 170.3 154.8 59.5 65.1 132.3 503.2 2,344.8
Population en 1999 (en milliers) 6,257 3,020 6,932 5,482 5,490 5,299 5,736 3,074 2,978 1,371 6,289 51,928
Taux de croissance annuel 3.9 3.9 3.3 2.9 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 2.1 3.1
Population en 2002 (en milliers) 7,018 3,387 7,641 5,973 6,122 5,875 6,341 3,398 3,292 1,516 6,694 57,258
Densité de population (ha/km carré) 704 63 26 15 12 34 41 57 51 11 13 24
 
Répartition du territoire (en %) 0.4 2.3 12.6 17.2 21.2 7.3 6.6 2.5 2.8 5.6 21.5 100.0
Répartition de la population (en %) 12.3 5.9 13.3 10.4 10.7 10.3 11.1 5.9 5.7 2.6 11.7 100.0
Indicateurs sociaux-économiques
Calories par jour en 1997 1,989 1,765 1,942 1,816 2,008 1,827 1,816 1,741 1,561 1,903 1,758 1,836
IPH-1 24.7 35.4 43.1 43.6 46.1 41.1 42.8 30.2 46.6 42.0 42.5 41.3
PIB par habitant en 1997 (en $ US) 322 137 32 25 138 82 82 110 67 100 31 103
PIB local par rapport au PIB national (en %) 313 133 31 24 134 80 80 107 65 97 30 100
PIB par habitant en PPP (en $ US) 2929 1238 293 229 1249 739 744 995 604 641 282 850
PPP local par rapport au PPP national (en %) 345 146 34 27 147 87 88 117 71 75 33 100
Indicateurs macroéconomiques
PIB en 1999 - millions de USD 1,900 400 200 100 800 400 300 400 200 200 200 4,300
PIB en 2002 - millions de USD 5,455
Fonction publique nationale  
Agents de l’État central en province 113,927 38,061 61,701 24,307 47,822 42,494 34,030 362,342
Retraités de l’État central en province 27,208 27,208
Masse salariale - Actifs (millions FC) 15,425 1,110 1,845 710 1,210 995 945 22,240
Masse salariale - retraités (millions FC) 645 110 80 135 280 255 95 1,600
Budgets des provinces (2002 -  millions FC)
Dépenses prévues 5,470 9,793 2,679 881 7,648 6,300 1,822 60 60 60 60 34,833
Dépenses effectives (estimé) 2,000 6,500 1,000 300 5,000 3,500 900 60 60 60 60 19,440
Dépenses effectives par habitant 285 1,919 131 50 817 596 142 18 18 40 9 340
 
Appendix 1:  Quelques données générales de nature sociale,  
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Appendix 2:  Synthèse des budgets des provinces pour l’exercice 2002
      (en millions de francs congolais)
Source: Ministère de l’Intérieur, sur la base des documents de budget des provinces.
KIN B/C BAN EQUA KAT K/OR K/OC Total
Recettes prévisionnelles 5,469.5 9,793.0 2,678.7 881.1 7,648.2 6,299.5 1,821.9 34,591.9
 
A) Recettes courantes 3,747.2 8,931.9 788.3 412.3 6,158.2 1,971.6 670.6 22,680.1
1. Solde au 31 décembre 2001 13.7 10.0 2.8 0.5 36.5 21.8 29.8 115.3
2. Rétrocessions des 3 régies 822.2 8,650.9 59.5 9.7 2,958.4 627.1 78.1 13,206.0
3. Rétrocession du MEFB 328.9 341.8 799.2 360.0 219.8 2,049.6
4. Recettes d’intérêt commun 2,644.8 244.0 230.8 53.6 2,246.0 936.0 312.5 6,667.8
5. Taxes spéciﬁques des provinces 266.5 27.0 166.2 6.6 118.1 26.6 30.3 641.4
B) Recettes exceptionnelles 29.3 17.6 32.0 3.5 482.3 13.0 96.4 674.0
C) Subvention de l’État pour les S/P 508.1 713.3 833.1 383.9 735.3 449.6 602.6 4,226.0
D) Budget annexe 502.2 502.2
E) Budget pour ordre 682.6 130.1 1,025.4 81.5 272.4 3,865.3 452.4 6,509.7
 
 
Dépenses prévisionnelles 5,469.5 9,793.0 2,678.8 881.1 7,648.2 6,299.5 1,821.9 34,591.9
 
A) Dépenses courantes 2,791.2 4,563.0 513.5 241.2 4,247.5 1,344.2 468.8 14,169.4
1. Rémunérations 437.9 1,074.9 136.4 86.0 791.9 284.6 134.6 2,946.3
2. Fonctionnement 654.2 2,572.4 232.1 114.2 1,709.5 398.0 138.7 5,819.2
3. Rétrocession aux EAD 1,586.9 223.2 138.5 32.1 1,347.6 561.6 187.5 4,077.5
4. Dette intérieure 112.2 692.4 6.5 8.8 398.4 100.0 8.0 1,326.4
B) Dépenses en capital 985.3 4,386.6 306.8 174.5 2,393.0 640.3 298.2 9,184.7
1. Infrastructures 593.2 3,553.6 231.8 150.4 971.3 424.2 159.9 6,084.4
2. Projets productifs 96.5 290.0 48.0 303.7 138.8 10.6 887.6
3. Secteurs sociaux 295.6 543.0 27.0 24.1 1,118.0 77.3 127.7 2,212.7
C) Fonctionnement des services provinciaux 508.1 713.3 833.1 383.9 735.3 449.6 602.6 4,226.0
D) Budget annexe 502.2 502.2
E) Budget pour ordre 682.6 130.1 1,025.4 81.5 272.4 3,865.3 452.4 6,509.7IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05 • 45
KIN B/C BAN EQUA KAT K/OR K/OC Total
 
Flux des régions vers le centre 46,332 30,953 93 71 9,996 3,707 464 91,616
 
A) Recettes ﬁscales perçues par 46,332 30,953 93 71 9,996 3,707 464 91,616
1. OFIDA 16,095 26,025 0 0 7,200 3,035 220 52,575
2. DGC 30,237 4,928 93 71 2,796 672 244 39,041
3. DGRAD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4. Autres 0
 
B) Autres transferts vers le centre 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1. Minerval (1) 0
2. Autres 0
 
Flux du centre vers les régions
 
A) Dépenses de fonctionnement 16,070 1,220 1,925 845 1,490 1,250 1,040 23,840
1. Rémunérations et pensions 16,070 1,220 1,925 845 1,490 1,250 1,040 23,840
2. Services provinciaux 0
3. Services sociaux en province 0
4. Rétrocessions aux EAD/CA 0
 
B) Dépenses sur PIP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1. Infrastructures 0
2. Projets productifs 0
3. Projets sociaux 0
 
C) Transferts du gouvernement central
1. Rétrocession automatique
2. Rétrocession variable
3. Subvention de fonctionnement 0
4. Subvention d’équipement 0
 
D) Aides des bailleurs de fonds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1. Aide budgétaire 0
2. Aide aux projets 0
 
*les quatres autres provinces etaient sous l’autorite des factions rebelles
Appendix 3:  Flux ﬁnanciers entre le centre et les provinces
      pendant l’exercice 2002  (en millions de francs congolais)46 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-05
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